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TERRORISM AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Rodney A. Smolla
This year is the Tenth Anniversary of the William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal, and the Journal is very fortunate and honored to have ProfessorRodney
Smolla publish an article in this year's volume. Professor Smolla played an
integralrole in the founding and organizing of not only the Journal, but also the
Institute of Bill ofRights Law at William & Mary Law School. The Journal extends
its most appreciative thanks to ProfessorSmolla for all his help.
In this Article, ProfessorSmolla examines the rightto free speech in the context
of Black v. Commonwealth, a case which dealt with a Virginia law that banned
cross-burning. While the legal doctrines arguedin the Black case were certainly
important then, they took on a whole new importance in light of the attacks on
September 11, 2001. Professor Smolla discusses whether the terroristsattacks
should affect the freedoms of speech and expression in America, concluding that,
while hormific and life-changing,the attack on America should not alter our First
Amendment rights.
It is Monday morning, September 10, 2001. I am standing at the advocate's
podium in the elegant courtroom of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Hanging on the
stately walls of the courtroom are the portraits of many of America's greatest jurists
- giants of history who shaped and defined the American Bill of Rights. Behind
me the courtroom, seats are more crowded than usual, filled with civil rights and
civil liberties lawyers, and with students from the University of Richmond and the
University of Virginia. In front of me are seven justices of the Virginia Supreme
Court.
The case presents a classic Bill of Rights conflict, indeed a classic American
conflict, placing in tension such fundamental values as freedom of speech, religious
tolerance, racial equality, and, the primal value that undergirds the very notion of
the social contract that constitutes a civil society, freedom from physical attack and
threats of violence - freedom, if you will, from fear itself. Seen through the eyes
of the highest law enforcement officials of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the
defendants on trial are terrorists. Seen from the eyes ofthe lawyers defending them,
the defendants on trial are being persecuted for exercising their freedom of
expression.
* George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of
Law. Prior to joining the law faculty at the University of Richmond, Professor Smolla was
on the law faculty at the College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, where
he served as Director of the Institute of Bill'of Rights Law. Professor Smolla worked with
students at William & Mary to found the Student Division of the Institute of Bill of Rights
Law, as well as the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal.He was invited by the Journal
to submit this article in honor of the ten-year anniversary of the Journal.
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I was a defense lawyer in Black v. Commonwealth,' acting as a cooperating
attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, and I was presenting
the oral argument on behalf of the defendant, Barry Elton Black. Black was a
leader of the Ku Klux Klan convicted of violating a Virginia statute that makes it
a felony to burn a cross with the intent to intimidate any person.! In the course of
my argument, I argued vociferously that Black was not a terrorist, that he had not
engaged in any actual conspiracy to commit violence, had not communicated any
genuine threat of violence against anyone, and had not intimidated any person in
any palpable or real sense. Black's expression, the burning of a cross, was hateful
and racist and offensive to most Americans of good will, I admitted, but it was not,
in and of itself, a terrorist act. When pointedly asked by one of the justices whether
the Commonwealth of Virginia was helpless to defend its citizens against the
criminal violence of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, I responded that the
commonwealth was not helpless at all: ordinary criminal laws were available to
police true threats, and in addition, laws directed to punishment of bias-motivated
crimes could be enacted.3 There is a distinction, I maintained, between hate crime
and hate speech, and the distinction is of constitutional dimension. The First
Amendment embodies no right to engage in hate crime. It does embody a right to
engage in hate speech. This distinction, I maintained, is fundamental to the
American way of life.

A jump forward in time. We are months past the disaster. Imagine an
American citizen. We will call him Alexander. Expressing anger and outrage at
Osama bin Laden, Alexander creates an effigy of bin Laden in his front yard,
hanging from a noose affixed to a tree limb, with a sign beneath the effigy stating:
"WANTED: DEAD OR ALIVE." People who stroll or drive through the
residential neighborhood have different reactions. Some honk their car horns in
approval, or yell affirmations like "Right On!" or "God Bless America!" Others do
not evidence any outward reaction at all, and we may only guess at their thoughts.
A few shake their heads or frown with disapproval. Perhaps they are offended by
the crudity of the display, or do not believe in the death penalty, or feel that the
image is inappropriate for children who regularly pass through the neighborhood.
One resident, however, is quite passionately angered by the presentation.
Imagine a second American citizen. We will call him Amhad. Born in Boston
553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001),petitionfor cert.filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 24,
0
2002) (No. 01-1107).
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996). See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying
text.
3 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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where his mother kept house while his father, now a physician, attended Harvard,
Amhad is a devout Moslem fundamentalist. His parents were born in Saudi Arabia,
and live there now. But Amhad, exercising the privileges of citizenship granted by
the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 has spent his adult life in the United States, writing,
speaking, and raising money for various Islamic organizations and charities. Amhad
believes that the Saudi government is corrupt, that Israel is evil, and that America
acts in concert with Israel to oppress the Palestinians and subjugate the world of
Islam. Most disturbingly, he actually sees Osama bin Laden as a prophet and hero.
And so he erects a counter-display on his front yard. It is a flattering effigy of
Osama bin Laden, standing proud and defiant. Under the likeness appear the words:
"OSAMA BIN LADEN: PROPHET AND HERO."
Amhad's display evokes far more furious responses than Alexander's. Eggs
and bottles are tossed in Amhad's front yard. Trespassers enter the property and set
the likeness of bin Laden afire. Amhad receives threatening phone calls, and is
stalked as he drives to and from his home Undaunted, he erects another version of
the same display, holds a press conference on his front lawn to profess his faith in
Osama bin Laden and denounce America, his country by birthright and choice, as
"the Great Satan." Amhad declares that under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution he has as much right to erect his pro-bin Laden effigy as his
neighbor had to erect his anti-bin Laden effigy, and demands that the police protect
his property (including his bin Laden tribute) and his person against vigilante
violence.

Amidst great furor, the city council meets. Some say that the city should force
both citizens to remove their bin Laden displays. Others say that Alexander's can
stay, but Amhad's must go. There are some with more extreme positions; they call
for Amhad's immediate arrest and prosecution, or at the least, his deportation. He
should be charged with sedition, or incitement to riot, his most shrill detractors
declaim. Some even say he is an "accessory after the fact" to the terrorism of
September 11, or a traitor to his country, guilty of providing aid and comfort to the
enemy.
The local ACLU defends Amhad, however, saying that he has committed no
crime, and urging restraint by everyone. "It's a free country," says the head of the
ACLU.
"No it isn't," replies a vitriolic critic. "We are at war now, and we're not so
free anymore."

4 The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment unequivocally declares: "Allpersons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
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It is Monday, September 10 again, back within the majestic and civil confines
of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Yet within the civility of the setting, the legal
and policy issues in contest are intense. I suspect that about half the spectators in
the courtroom agree with the positions I am taking, and about half agree with the
Commonwealth. From the questions posed to the advocates during oral argument,
I guess that the members of the Court might also be divided, and that the final
outcome of the appeal is very much in doubt.
If the outcome was in doubt that day, however, in my advocate's selfrighteousness I had no doubt about what the outcome ought to be. The First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech was, in my constitutional
constellation, the true lodestar. I felt great certitude on this. To the extent that
others in the courtroom might not have agreed, they were entitled to their opinions,
but I was certain they were wrong.
None ofus in that courtroom that day could have known that within twenty-four
hours all our lives would be profoundly changed. And none of us in that courtroom
could have known that the events of the next day would hit the American
consciousness with enough force to rattle the foundations of all certitudes. Like so
many Americans, on September II Ifelt deep shock, grief, anger, and dismay, and
I did what I could to provide assistance and comfort to those most directly affected
by the terrorist violence. And like so many, as the immediate shock and sorrow
gave way to participation in the national analysis, discussion, and debate over our
society's proper responses to the events, I found myself, with others, beginning to
re-examine many of the basic habits and premises of our national life.
"Certitude is not the test of certainty[,]" admonished Oliver Wendell Holmes,
"[w]e have been cock-sure of many things that were not so."' I do not know that I
could have been more cocksure in my abiding belief in the importance of our Bill
of Rights, particularly the freedoms of speech, religion, and press guaranteed in the
First Amendment. And indeed, I took great comfort in the fact that in the
immediate hours and days following the attacks, our political leadership did not call
for scraping our core constitutional freedoms, but for vigilant adherence to them.
President Bush admirably set the tone for all of our nation's leadership in his
insistence that if we abandon our liberty out of fear of terrorism, we will have given
terrorism the very victory it craves, for we would have then surrendered to the
terrorist's objective of displacing our freedom with fear.6 Our leaders thus did not
Oliver Wendell Holmes, NaturalLaw, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1918).
6 See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States
in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347,
1350 (Sept. 20, 2001):
I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute,
even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of
America and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our
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call for wholesale suspensions of freedom of speech or press, did not call for the
end of due process of law, did not seek to erase the presumption of innocence, did
not announce the abandonment of individual privacy, or freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
If the rhetoric of freedom remained resonant, however, I had my doubts that the
reality of freedom would go undiminished. As we got down to the actual task of
enacting laws responsive to the attacks of September 11,' I observed significant
slippage in our commitment to the Bill of Rights. Through a combination of
congressional enactments and administrative policy pronouncements, it became
clear that there was no longer any such thing as business as usual.
This is not shocking or unexpected. It is the normal societal response to sudden
catastrophe, as it is often the normal individual response. Nor is it unprecedented.
Throughout American history, we have compromised our commitment to certain
Bill of Rights freedoms when exigent emergency appeared to require it.8 A
constitutional right does not seem of much value if the Constitution itself is
imperiled, and the Constitution does not seem much more than script on ancient
parchment when suicidal terrorists threaten to bring down the nation. What is the
point of saving an abstraction like "a constitutional right" when skyscrapers fall
from the sky crushing thousands? What is the point of blind faith in a document
called the "Bill of Rights" when a heinous biological agent in the hands of the next
ingenious terrorist might murder millions? As Abraham Lincoln asked, "[A]re all
the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?" 9
We might well ponder Lincoln's question with regard to any constitutional right
that has been placed in play by the attacks of September 11. Pick yours: the
definition of "treason,"' 0 the right to trial by jury," the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure," the requirement of probable cause, 3 the right to

principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.... As long as the
United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of
terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world.
Id.
7 E.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
8 John Conyers, Jr., Editorial, Liberty at Risk, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2001, at A33.
9
Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
'0 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13

id.
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the assistance of counsel,'"or any number of other established constitutional norms
arguably placed in jeopardy by laws and policies proposed in response to the
traumatic September events.
In this Article, I seek to explore Lincoln's question in the context of one Bill of
Rights liberty, freedom of speech, as a vehicle for considering the larger questions
of whether and how a nation subjected to a sudden terrifying violent attack may
maintain a high degree of fidelity to its fundamental commitments to individual
freedom. Although the free speech question is by no means the only constitutional
conflict posed by the terrorism attacks, it is certainly an important one. We are said
to be in a war against terrorism.' 5 The impact of war on freedom of speech is an old
and vexing question. In Schenck v. United States,16 it was argued that "[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no
Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."' 7
The cross-burning case that I argued on September 10 is but one small dispute,
one relatively petty and obscure conflict, in the long American history of free
speech litigation. Yet it provides a superb window from which to view the entire
American struggle to reconcile our constitutional traditions prior to September 11
with our altered realities since that day. As I waited for the Virginia Supreme Court
to render its decision in Black v. Commonwealth," the litigation took on a
bellwether quality. I wondered what impact the terrorist attack of September 11
would have on a case submitted to a court on September 10. I did not contemplate
this in any vain or crass sense. I did not ask whether I would win my case or lose
my case. Instead I contemplated the problem in the broader sense of one who cares,
one who has spent a good part of his professional life engaged in these questions,
one deeply affected - with the rest of the nation - by the dastardly September
attacks. I asked, in short, both whether the outcome wouldbe changed by the events
of September 11, and more importantly, whether the outcome should be changed.
There was genuine soul-searching here, personal and communal. In discussions
with students, discussions conducted at symposia and teach-ins and town meetings,
the impact of the September 11 attacks was a constant topic, and I learned much
from the insights and observations of others. At the end, I came away with at least
a provisional answer on the "should" question, though I had little confidence in my
14 U.S. CONST.

amend VI.

"5President's Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1301, 1302 (Sept. 11, 2001) ("America and our friends and allies... stand together
to win the war against terrorism.").
16 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
17 Id. at 52. As discussed later, Holmes' position on this issue appeared to evolve in
certain cases after Schenck. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
IS 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), petitionfor cert.filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 24,
2002) (No. 01-1107).
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ability to predict the "would."
My answer, for what it is worth, is that our First Amendment principles should
not bend in the aftermath of September 11, despite all we have been through.

At the heart of the argument I pressed before the Virginia Supreme Court on
September 10 was the supposition that violent speech is not the same as violent
action. Under this view, which was, prior to September 11, established
constitutional doctrine, 9 the government may not punish the mere abstract
advocacy of violence, even the abstract advocacy of the violent overthrow of the
government, of murder, of terrorism. 0 Concomitantly, the government may not
punish mere membership in a group that has as its firmly adopted agenda the violent
overthrow of government, murder, or terrorism.2 ' If this view is accepted, a Ku
"9See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
2, See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937):
20

[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The
holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those
who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on
that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are
to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as
to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes
elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public
peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation
of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting
them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly
and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
Id.; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1957):
The second observation is that both the record and the Government's brief in
this Court make it clear that the Government's thesis was that the Communist
Party, or at least the Communist Party of California, constituted the
conspiratorial group, and that membership in the conspiracy could therefore be
proved by showing that the individual petitioners were actively identified with
the Party's affairs and thus inferentially parties to its tenets.... But when it
comes to Party advocacy or teaching in the sense of a call to forcible action at
some future time we cannot but regard this record as strikingly deficient. At best
this voluminous record shows but a half dozen or so scattered incidents which,
even under the loosest standards, could be deemed to show such advocacy. Most
of these were not connected with any of the petitioners, or occurred many years
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Klux Klan leader may not be put in jail merely for expressing publicly the view, as
an abstraction, that it is desirable to murder Blacks, Jews, or Catholics' or for
expressing the view, as an abstraction,that society would be better off if somebody
murdered the president. 2 Nor may any person be put in jail merely for being a
member of the Ku Klux Klan, even if it is proven that the Klan is committed to such
a terrorist agenda.23
This is not to say that a Klan leader would be immune from punishment for
using speech actually to plan a violent attack. 4 Nor is it to say that a Klan leader
would be immune from punishment for inciting a violent attack, if it could be
proven that the reigning constitutional standard, articulated in Brandenburg v.
before the period covered by the indictment. We are unable to regard this
sporadic showing as sufficient to justify viewing the Communist Party as the
nexus between these petitioners and the conspiracy charged. We need scarcely
say that however much one may abhor even the abstract preaching of forcible
overthrow of government, or believe that forcible overthrow is the ultimate
purpose to which the Communist Party is dedicated, it is upon the evidence in
the record that the petitioners must be judged in this case.
Id.
22
23

See infra note 88.
See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961):
[T]he mere abstract teaching ofCommunist theory, including the teaching of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.
There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to
violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently
pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material
regarding Communist Party teaching, and to justify the inference that such a call
to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole, and not merely to
some narrow segment of it.

Id.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(dissenting in a case in which a majority affirmed the convictions of communist party leaders
for espousing the overthrow of the United States, but adding that he would have affirmed
the convictions if actual planning of terrorist activity had been involved):
24

If this were a case where those who claimed protection under the First
Amendment were teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the
President, the filching of documents from public files, the planting of bombs,
the art of street warfare, and the like, I would have no doubts. The freedom to
speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious
conduct should be beyond the pale ....
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Ohio,2" was satisfied.
Under the Brandenburgtest:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
6
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.1
Violent rhetoric and graphic hate-filled demonstrations standing alone, however, do
not satisfy this standard. To deconstruct this proposition, it is useful to look at the
facts ofthe Virginia cross-burning cases, and the legal arguments presented in them,
more closely.

Richmond, Virginia's capital city, was the capital of the Confederacy.
Following the Civil War and well into the twentieth century, much of Virginia life
remained highly racist and segregated," and like people in many states where Jim
Crow laws were well-entrenched, many Virginians resisted the mandate of Brown
v. BoardofEducation.2 8 Yet despite the stubborn persistence of racism in Virginia,
and the commonwealth's official endorsement of racial separation, the
commonwealth did move against the excesses of the Ku Klux Klan, even before the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown.
Virginia passed its first law targeting certain expressive activities of the Klan
in 1952.2 ' The law arose against the backdrop of cross-burnings in front of
businesses and residences owned and occupied by African Americans.30
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 447.
27 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's antimiscegenation law, entitled "The Act to Preserve Racial Integrity.").
28 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1)(striking down "separate but equal" school regime);
see also Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I) (requiring the
dismantling of dual school systems with "all deliberate speed."). Throughout Virginia the
mandate of Brown was either resisted or followed grudgingly. In Green v. County School
Board,391 U.S. 430 (1968), decided well over a decade after Brown, the Supreme Court
held that New Kent County's token "freedom of choice" plan for implementing Brown
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and declared that the time for immediately
desegregating schools had come, and that the regime of gradual compliance under the rubric
of "all deliberate speed" was over.
29 Act of Apr. 2, 1952, 1952 Va. Acts ch. 483, at 777 (prohibiting the wearing of masks
or the placement of a burning cross on the property of another without consent) (current
version at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2422 to 423 (Michie 1996)).
30 See CrossBurned atManakin; Third in Area, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 26, 1951,
25

26
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Responding to these racist episodes, Governor Battle proposed statutory restrictions
on the cross-burning activities of the Klan.3 The commonwealth's first anti-crossburning statute only prohibited cross-burning on the property of another person,32
and was indisputably enacted to target the cross-burning activities of the Klan,33
After 1952, the commonwealth's anti-cross-burning statute would be amended a
number of times, with each amendment expanding its scope and potency. In 1968,
for example, the commonwealth dropped the requirement that the cross-burning
only take place on the property of another, and inserted a powerful evidentiary
provision, under which the mere burning of a cross was treated in itselfas prima
facie evidence of intent to intimidate another.34 In its present form, the law is quite
sweeping:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned,
a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place. Any
person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a
Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent
to intimidate a person or group of persons."
Virginia's cross-burning statute does not mention the Ku Klux Klan by name,
and clearly applies to anyone who might burn a cross to intimidate any other person.
at 4; Cross FiredNearSuffolk Stirs Probe,RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 1949, § 2, at 1;
CrossIs Burned at Reedville Home, RICH. NEWS LEADER, Apr. 14, 1951, at 1; Huge Cross
Is Burned on Hill Just South of Covington, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 14, 1950, at 6;
PoliceAid Requested by Teacher: CrossIs Burned in Negro's Yard, RICH. NEWS LEADER,

Jan. 21, 1949, at 19.
" 'State Might Well Consider' Restrictions on Ku Klux Klan, Governor Battle
Comments, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1952, at 7.
32 The law stated in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to place or cause to be placed on
the property of another in the Commonwealth of Virginia a burning or a flaming
cross or any manner of exhibit in which a burning or flaming cross, real or
simulated, is a whole or a part, without first obtaining written permission of the
owner or occupier of the premises so to do.
1952 Va. Acts ch. 483, § 2, at 777.
" See Bill to Curb KKK Passedby the House, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1952, at
5; GovernorBacks Curb on Ku Klux Activities, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 1952, § 2,
at 1; Senate Passes BroadenedAnti-Klan Bill, RICH. NEWS LEADER, Feb. 23, 1952, at 11.
" Act of Apr. 2, 1968, 1968 Va. Acts ch. 350, at 450 (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-423 (Michie 1996)).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
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Yet there is no doubt that the Klan was the group the legislature had in mind when
it passed the statute.36 Indeed, other contemporaneous provisions enacted with the
cross-burning prohibition dealt with other aspects of Klan ritual, including the
wearing of masks; as the Virginia Court of Appeals would candidly explain when
it upheld the mask provisions of the law, the statutory scheme was obviously aimed
at the Klan. 3
The Virginia Supreme Court's examination of the commonwealth's crossburning statute in 2001 actually involved three consolidated cases, one of which
arose from Klan activity and two of which did not. 38 The two cases that were not
part of Klan activity arose from a cross-burning incident that plainly implicated
illegal activity entirely distinct from the act of burning the cross. The two
defendants, Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara, after consuming alcohol, sought
to "get back" at a neighbor, James Jubilee, by burning a crudely constructed cross
in Jubilee's back yard. Jubilee was African American, and while there was some
evidence in the record that racism may have been a factor in the incident, the
defendants did not appear to have any large ideological agenda in their assault on
Mr. Jubilee. 39 The convictions of these two defendants were affirmed by the
Virginia Court of Appeals, which sustained the constitutionality of the crossburning statute in O'Mara v. Commonwealth.4' The key point here is that if
36

See supra notes 30-31.

" In Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 406 S.E.2d 398 (Va. 1991), the Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's anti-mask law, a companion provision to the crossburning law, openly acknowledging the law's link to the Klan. Id.at 401 ("We acknowledge
that the legislature's original motivation for enacting the anti-mask statute may have been
to 'unmask the Klan.' The statute was, after all, created in the same act with statutes
prohibiting cross burning and intimidation, activities historically associated with the Klan.").
The court in Hernandez sustained the law, reasoning that it could be sustained for contentneutral reasons, such as "the prevention of violence, crime and disorder by the unmasking
of potential criminals." Id. Interestingly, the court in Hernandezexplicitly distinguished the
prohibition on the wearing of a mask from other aspects of the Klan's "uniform," stating:
The record does not establish, as the appellant contends, that the mask is so
identified with the Ku Klux Klan that it is a symbol of its identity. The robe and
the hood may be such symbols, but the mask is not. The mask worn without the
robe and the hood would be meaningless. The mask adds nothing, save fear and
intimidation, to the symbolic message expressed by the wearing of the robe and
the hood. Without the mask, the social and political message conveyed by the
uniform of the Ku Klux Klan is the same as it would be with the mask.
Id. at 400.
" Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 741 & n.l (Va. 200 1),petitionfor cert.
filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Jan. 24,2002) (No. 01-1107).
31 See id. at 748 (Hasselll, J., dissenting).
4o 535 S.E.2d 175 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). The Virginia Supreme Court granted an appeal
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Virginia had never enacted its cross-burning law, the two defendants in the O 'Mara
case could still have been prosecuted under other laws. There is no constitutional
right to enter another's backyard without permission and bum a cross (or anything
else) there, and the defendants in O 'Marawere obviously guilty of some crime, and
could certainly have been prosecuted and convicted under laws of general
applicability such as criminal trespass."
The third case, Black v. Commonwealth,4 2 involved a Ku Klux Klan leader,
Barry Elton Black. I was the lead appellate lawyer on behalf of Black, as part of
team assembled by the ACLU of Virginia that included attorneys David Baugh and
Sara Davis. 3 David Baugh, a nationally prominent defense attorney, is African
American, an irony not lost on anyone, which served to underscore vividly the fact
that the defense lawyers were not defending the substance of Mr. Black's racist
message, but his right to say it. Unlike the trespassers in the O 'Maracase, who
were obviously guilty of some crime other than cross-burning and could have been
prosecuted for those other crimes, Barry Elton Black was not guilty of any other
offense, and no prosecution for any crime other than cross-burning would have been
plausible.
Black organized and led a Klan rally on private property in Cana, Virginia on
August 22, 1998. During the rally, which was conducted with the permission of the
landowner (who was present during the rally), Klan members set fire to a cross,
approximately twenty-five to thirty feet in height. Following a Klan custom, the
Klan members played the sacred hymn Amazing Graceover a loudspeaker as they
marched around the cross, shouting and chanting. Their statements included
diatribes against Blacks and Mexicans, and Bill and Hillary Clinton."
The burning cross was visible from a nearby public highway. The County
Sheriff and a Deputy Sheriff, upon learning of the rally, parked on the highway and
walked up to the Klan members, letting them know they would be watching the
rally from the road, keeping an eye on things. Several cars drove by the scene while
the cross was lit, including one car with an African American family inside. Other
than the two officers and these itinerant highway travelers, only one outsider
from this decision. The results of that appeal are revealed later in this essay. See infra note
126.
41 VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-121 (Supp.
2001).
No. 1581-99-3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (mem.); see supra note 38 (addressing
subsequent history).
43 Robert O'Neil and Joshua Wheeler, of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression, filed an amicus brief in support of Mr. Black. Mr. Elliott was
represented by James 0. Broccoletti; Mr. O'Mara by Kevin Martingayle. John H. McLees,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, represented the Commonwealth of Virginia.
44 Black, 553 S.E.2d at 748 (Hasselll, J., dissenting); Rex Bowman, Cross-Burner
42

Convicted: VerdictSquashes FreeSpeech Argument, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Jun. 24, 1999,
atAl.
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observed the rally. She was Rebecca Sechrist.4 5
I wish to dwell a bit on Mrs. Sechrist's reaction to the rally, because I find her
testimony in the case quite poignant and significant. Just prior to the rally, Mrs.
Sechrist and her husband had a mobile home delivered to the parcel of property
adjacent to the field on which the rally took place. Mrs. Sechrist had not yet moved
into the home, but was in the process of preparing it for occupancy on the date of
the rally. Mrs. Sechrist, who was related to the owner of the property where the
rally occurred, did not approve of the Klan or the rally, which she watched from the
front of her new mobile home. Although on her own land, she was close enough to
hear and see what was going on, and she testified that she heard the Klan members
expressing statements that were "real bad" about Blacks and Mexicans.' In the
most detailed explanation of what she heard, Mrs. Sechrist testified:
They... talked a lot about blacks - and I don't call [] the word they called
it... it started with an N and I don't, I don't use that word, I'm sorry - but
they talked real bad about the blacks and the Mexicans and they talked
about how, one... guy got up and said that he would love to take a .30/.30
and just random shoot the blacks and talked about how they would like to
send the blacks and the Mexicans back from where they come from and
talked about President Clinton and Hillary Clinton and about the
government funding money for the, for the people that can't afford housing
and stuffand ... how their tax paying goes to keep the black people up and
stuff like that.47
During the trial, Mrs. Sechrist vividly described how the rally made her feel:
Oh, it made me feel awful.... [T]hey all walked around and then they
would go in one circle and say things and then they would go around in
another circle and say things and then they went up and all met at the
bottom of the cross and lit it and played Amazing Grace and I tell you what,
... it was just terrible. It was terrible to see, that, when they were talking
about random shooting black people and all, the guy that said it and
everything talked about killing people and then get up there and said...
that he was a good Christian and when he died, he knowed he was going to
heaven and then to burn the cross like that, I just... couldn't begin to put
in words how I felt.... I sat there and I cried. I didn't know what was
going to happen between everything going on. It was just terrible.48
41
'

4'

Black, 553 S.E.2d at 748 (Hasselll, J., dissenting); Bowman, supra note 44.
Black, 553 S.E.2d at 748 (Hasselll, J., dissenting).
Id. (alterations and omissions in original).
Black v. Commonwealth, No. 1581-99-3, slip op. app. at 178 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
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Mrs. Sechrist testified that her feelings of fear and dismay lasted for a "couple
months" after the rally.49 Mrs. Sechrist, who is not African American or Hispanic,
testified that "I think they were trying to scare me," but at the same time she
admitted that no participant in the Klan ever did anything threatening directed to
her.5" She conceded, indeed, that she would have felt much the same reaction had
she witnessed video footage of the same rally on television."
When I say that Mrs. Sechrist's testimony is poignant and significant, I mean
to say that I find that it rings true, that it is authentic, that it probably well reflects
the way many people would have reacted had they been in her shoes that day
watching the Klan rally. I daresay that my own reaction could have been much the
same as hers.

From a First Amendment perspective, it was my view that in all three of these
cross-burning cases, there was one threshold argument so powerful that it made the
cases relatively easy to decide, virtual "slam-dunks." None of the convictions could
stand, I thought, because the Virginia cross-burning statute itself could not stand:
brazenly grounded in viewpoint-discrimination, the statute was facially
unconstitutional.
The critical precedent was a 1992 United States Supreme Court decision that
also involved cross-burning, R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul.52 In facts very similar to the
facts of the O'Mara case, R.A. V. involved a prosecution against several young
hoodlums who entered an African American family's yard at night and lit a cross.53
They were clearly guilty of several routine crimes, including trespass, but they were
prosecuted not under such general laws, but under a hate-speech law, which stated
in pertinent part that:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
2000) (on file with author).
49 Id. at 179.
5o Id. at 187-89.
51

Id.

505 U.S. 377 (1992).
" Id. at 379.
5 Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS.
CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
52
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The United States Supreme Court struck down the statute in a far-reaching opinion
by Justice Antonin Scalia, centered in the core judgment that "the ordinance goes
even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.""
Justice Scalia's opinion for the five-justice majority severely condemned the
message conveyed by cross burning, but insisted that the government must combat
the evils of racism and violence through mechanisms that do not offend the First
Amendment: "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in
someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its
disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the
fire.' 56
I argued that the Virginia cross-burning statute simply could not be
distinguished from the law struck down in R.A. V., and that this ended the matter.
The commonwealth strenuously opposed this claim, making a number of clever
points. First, the commonwealth maintained that the Virginia statute only made
criminal the act of cross-burning carried out for the purpose of "intimidation." The
statute in R.A. V. did not contain any such "intimidation" element, but was triggered
by a different standard, one which required that the perpetrator know or have reason
to know that the actions would "arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."57
As I saw it, two differences between the statutes might thus be teased out. The
term "intimidation" is more pointed and concrete than the phrase "anger, alarm, or
resentment." Intimidation, as the trial court in the Black prosecution had construed
it, was akin to a classic physical threat. The jury in Black's case could only find
intimidation if it found that Black had intentionally placed someone in fear of
bodily harm. 58 Secondly, it might be argued that the ordinance in R.A. V. was
explicitly calibrated in terms of the ideological reaction of the victim - unlike the
Virginia statute, which on its face dealt only with "intimidation," an ostensibly
neutral term, the R.A. V. statute required that the anger, alarm, or resentment be
grounded in the "basis" of certain forms of identity - race, color, creed, religion,
or gender.59 To put it in simple terms, whereas the Virginia cross-burning statute
seemed to make it a crime to bum a cross for the purpose of communicating a threat
along the lines of "I would like to hurt you," the ordinance in R.A. V. seemed to
countenance throwing a person in jail for communicating a message that might not
be threateningas such, but merely offensive (in the sense that messages that arise
"anger, alarm or resentment" are offensive), and moreover, offensive for a relatively
narrow set of reasons - offensive "on the basis of" race, color, creed, religion, or
55
56

Id. at 391.
Id. at 396.

5' Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGs. CODE § 292.02).
5' Black v. Commonwealth, No.1581-99-3 slip op. app. at 223-25.

59 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02).
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gender.
Bolstering these arguments, the Commonwealth advanced a related theory,
emphasizing that the Virginia cross-burning statute applied to any person who
burned a cross for any reason. It was not limited to prosecutions against the Klan
- indeed two of the three defendants before the Virginia Supreme Court had
nothing to do with the Klan - and it was not limited to persons who burned a cross
to advance a classic hate-speech agenda, such as the racist or anti-Catholic or antiSemitic hates of supremacist groups.
Although clever, Ifound these arguments unpersuasive when I first heard them,
and I find them no more persuasive now, despite the terrorist attacks of September
11. The commonwealth, in my view, was not reading R.A. V. for all it was worth.
In myjudgment, the essential point ofR.A. V.was that a law banning fighting words
is permissible, but not a law banning "racist fighting words." Thus, a law banning
intimidation may be permissible if the concept of "intimidation" is sufficiently
confined, but not a law banning "intimidation-through-cross-burning." It was
simply irrelevant that the statue included as an element the requirement of an intent
to intimidate, for even with this element included, the law was infected with
viewpoint-discrimination. The Virginia cross-burning statute was thus not a
genuine law of general applicability, a law that prohibited only conduct that
threatened physical harm, the type of law that would not raise a viewpoint-bias
problem.6
In my estimation no cross-burning law, no matter what extra elements of intent
or harm are added, will ever escape the viewpoint-discrimination problem, or ever
be constitutional, simply and completely because it is a cross-burning law.62 The
simple and sufficient proof of this point is that the Supreme Court in R.A. V. found
unavailing the effort by the Minnesota Supreme Court to save the statute at issue
Id. at 391-92 ("St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.").
61 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (sustaining a"hate crime" law- not
a "hate speech" law - that raised the applicable criminal penalties for crimes committed
with biased intent).
62 See State v.Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511,514 (S.C. 1993) (applying R.A. V.to strike down
60

cross-burning law):
The State urges us to construe [this statute] as proscribing "fighting words." We
discern that we cannot cure the unconstitutionality of [this statute] by such a
construction. Like the Minnesota statute, [this statute] does not completely
prohibit the use of fighting words; rather, it prevents only the use of those
fighting words symbolicly [sic] conveyed by cross burning. The government
may not selectively limit speech that communicates, as does a burning cross,
messages of racial or religious intolerance.
Id. (footnote omitted).

2002]

TERRORISM AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

567

with a narrowing construction that would have rendered it otherwise constitutional,
because the construction did not cure the viewpoint-discrimination defect.63
Precisely the same problem exists with flag desecration statutes. Consider how
important the American flag has become to our culture since September 11. I had
two flying from my house and one from each car. Like many Americans, in the
days immediately following the attacks, it was difficult for me to see the flag or hear
the National Anthem or GodBlessAmerica without tearing or swelling with intense
emotion. Yet under established First Amendment doctrine it is impossible to devise
a constitutional anti-flag-desecration law, because one cannot imagine such a law
that is not grounded in some positive view of the flag as a symbol of our national
unity and identity, which does not also fundamentally serve the purpose of
discouraging expression corrosive of that unity and identity. 4
The killer argument against the government for both cross-burning or flagburning laws (or for any other laws identifying some specific symbol, such as the
Confederate Flag or a Swastika or an effigy of Osama bin Laden) is that the
government will never have a credible answer to the question of why it must pass
such a law, rather than rely on statutes of general applicability - such as laws
against murder, arson, assault, battery, trespass, or threats. Even when such neutral
laws incidentally implicate the exercise of expression, they are at most subject to
mere "intermediate scrutiny" review, the standard applicable to content-neutral
laws, and are commonly upheld.65 When the government eschews these readily
available tools to single out expression involving a particular symbol such as the
flag or a cross, the underlying reason is obvious: the government's enactment has
nothing to do with the physical characteristics of the symbol, but with its meaning.
A cross is an object or symbol of a particular shape: a vertical bar traversed by a
horizontal bar. Nothing in this geometric configuration of the vertical and
horizontal carries any peculiarly dangerous potency. It is not the fire that burns
In R.A. V. the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to save the hate speech law at issue
through a narrowing construction that purported to limit application of the law to situations
in which the speech was directed to the incitement of imminent lawless action and likely to
do so - the incitement standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In re
R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The Supreme
Court of the United States nonetheless ruled that even if the statute were otherwise a valid
incitement or a fighting words law, it would remain unconstitutional, because it would still
be tainted with viewpoint discrimination. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391-96.
' See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989) (striking down a state flag desecration
law, stating that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990) (striking down federal flag desecration law passed in response to Texas v. Johnson).
65 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (sustaining prohibition on draftcard desecration, which could be defended on the content-neutral grounds of protecting the
orderly administration of the draft).
63
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hotter when flaming sticks are crossed, but the passions that the fire inflames.
The only response that the government can ever have to this line of argument
is to invoke its own prior experiences with regard to the symbol. This response is
at least intellectually honest.
For many Christians, who comprise a substantial percentage of American
society," the cross is a sacred symbol imbued with powerful religious meaning,
connoting the crucifixion of Christ. To many Christians the desecration of the
symbol as part of a ritual of violence and hate is inherently offensive. That the
cross-burning ritual often includes the juxtaposition of hateful messages with the
playing or singing of a sacred hymn such as Amazing Grace or The Old Rugged
Cross only compounds the offense. More pointedly, any American with even a
passing sense of our national history knows that cross burning is a ritual strongly
associated with bigotry and violence.6 Cross-burning laws exist because cross66

BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., GRADUATE CMR. OF THE CITY UNIV. OF NEW YORK,

AMERICAN REUGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY, 2001, at 12 ex. 1 (2001) (finding that 76.5
percent of U.S. adults identify themselves as Christian), availableathttp://wwv.gc.cuny.edu
/studies/aris.pdf.
67 Justice Clarence Thomas has told the story as eloquently as any:
There is little doubt that the Klan's main objective is to establish a racist white
government in the United States. In Klan ceremony, the cross is a symbol of
white supremacy and a tool for the intimidation and harassment of racial
minorities, Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the
Klan. The cross is associated with the Klan not because of religious worship,
but because of the Klan's practice of cross burning. Cross burning was entirely
unknown to the early Ku Klux Klan, which emerged in some Southern States
during Reconstruction. The practice appears to have been the product of
Thomas Dixon, whose book The Clansman formed the story for the movie, The
Birth of a Nation. In the book, cross burning is borrowed from an "old Scottish
rite" (Dixon apparently believed that the members of the Reconstruction Ku
Klux Klan were the "reincarnated souls of the Clansmen of Old Scotland") that
the Klan uses to celebrate the execution of a former slave. Although the cross
took on some religious significance in the 1920's when the Klan became
connected with certain southern white clergy, by the postwar period it had
reverted to its original function as an instrument of intimidation. To be sure, the
cross appears to serve as a religious symbol of Christianity for some Klan
members. The hymn "The Old Rugged Cross" is sometimes played during cross
burnings. But to the extent that the Klan had a message to communicate in
Capitol Square, it was primarily a political one. During his testimony before the
District Court, the leader of the local Klan testified that the cross was seen "as
a symbol of freedom, as a symbol of trying to unite our people." The Klan
chapter wished to erect the cross because it was also "a symbol of freedom from
tyranny," and because it "was also incorporated in the confederate battle flag."
Of course, the cross also had some religious connotation; the Klan leader linked
the cross to what he claimed was one of the central purposes of the Klan: "to
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burning, the stock ritual of the Klan, has often in the past proven to be an especially
potent device for intimidation. It is also a ritual that may on occassion stir up the
hateful passions of Klan members and provoke them to become an out-of-control
mob that sets out from the cross-burning rally to engage in acts of terror or violence.
In short, there is nothing at base irrationalabout society's fear and loathing for
cross-burning.
This is a powerful argument, but an unconstitutional one. It concedes the very
motive that the First Amendment prohibits, for the argument contains the intrinsic
admission that it is indeed the meaningthat the ritual of cross-burning has taken on
as a symbol of hate that forms the basis for the legislativejudgment to prohibit cross
burning. The government cannot have it both ways - it cannot claim on the one
hand that the cross-burning law is neutral, and then seek to justify its statute on the
grounds that in our common experience, cross burning is typically a ritual of
intimidation and prejudice.68
It matters not that persons other than the Klan may commandeer the ritual, or
that the law reaches anyone who burns a cross no matter what that person's specific
ideological program. In Texas v. Johnson,6 9 the United States Supreme Court
rejected this very argument, rebuffing an attempt to save the Texas flag desecration
law on the supposition that the law applied evenhandedly to any person or group
who desecrated the flag, from whatever political perspective.7"
establish a Christian government in America." But surely this message was both
political and religious in nature.
Although the Klan might have sought to convey a message with some
religious component, I think that the Klan had a primarily nonreligious purpose
in erecting the cross. The Klan simply has appropriated one of the most sacred
of religious symbols as a symbol of hate.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770-71 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
68 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 392-93:
This is wordplay. What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced
by violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor,
etc., produced by other fighting words is nothing other than the fact that it is
caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message.
Id.
69
70

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at413 n.9:
If Texas means to suggest that its asserted interest does not prefer Democrats
over Socialists, or Republicans over Democrats, for example, then it is beside
the point, for Johnson does not rely on such an argument.... Thus, if Texas
means to argue that its interest does not prefer any viewpoint over another, it is
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Cross-burning laws and flag-burning laws are mirrors of the same altruism.
Laws calculated to shelter the flag are passed to enhance our sense of national pride
and national unity. Laws calculated to shelter the cross are passed to prevent the
perverse use of the cross as a symbol of fraction and disunity. In both instances, the
ends are admirable but the means unconstitutional. Hard as it sometimes is to
accept, Americans have the right to fly flags or trample on them, to worship crosses
or bum them. 7

Returning to the imaginary Osama bin Laden effigy controversy, it seems to me
clear enough that the First Amendment values forbidding viewpoint discrimination
ought to remain sufficiently hale to preclude a number ofpossible responses the city
might be tempted to employ in reaction to the two bin Laden effigies. The city
surely could not, consistent with our constitutional traditions, expressly permit antibin Laden symbols and statements, but forbid supportive statements. Some might
claim, rhetorically, that open support ofbin Laden is "treason" or "sedition," but the
law has long distinguished between anti-war protest and more tangible provision of
aid and comfort to the enemy.72 And the decision in R.A. V. would seem to clearly
bar the city from treating one side of a debate one way and the other side another. 3
Nor, following the Supreme Court's subsequent elaborations on what constitutes
"viewpoint discrimination," could the city attempt a broader ban, on all symbolic
expression related to Osama bin Laden, for or against him. To ban all effigies of
bin Laden, whether they communicate praise or disgust for the man, is still to ban
the symbol of the man (and only one man to boot) and as such, would violate the
First Amendment. 4
This analysis means that the city, if it wishes to respond at all to the crisis, must
resort to some other tactic. It must invoke some general law, not related to
viewpoint, against one of the effigies or both. The types of general laws that jump
to mind are such prohibitions as "breach of peace," "communication of threats," or
"incitement to lawless action." These types of prosecutions are viewpoint-neutral,
and as such avoid the problems posed by R.A. V. They instead are grounded in a
mistaken; surely one's attitude toward the flag and its referents is a viewpoint.
Id.
7'Thus, however much we may regard the ultimate motive of the government in seeking
to shelter the crosses or the flags from defilement as altruistic, the mechanism of such laws
violates a core principle of the First Amendment. See id. at 418 ("It is not the State's ends,
but its means, to which we object.").
7 See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 52-57, 59-60 and accompanying text.
71See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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claimed link between speech and violence.

In the cross-burning cases, it was not strictly necessary for the Virginia
Supreme Court to reach the question of whether the cross-burning law violated the
First Amendment for reasons other than the viewpoint discrimination problem, for
if the laws were viewpoint-based, they were unconstitutional without more."
Nonetheless, as a subsidiary argument, defense lawyers in the Black case argued
that even if the viewpoint problem with the statute did not exist, the law failed to
meet the elements of the incitement standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio.76 In
Brandenburgthe Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a Klan leader for
engaging in a cross-burning Klan ritual virtually identical to that in Commonwealth
v. Black, holding that the defendant was guilty only of the abstract teaching of the
moral propriety of racist violence, which the Court treated as different in kind from
an actual purpose to incite immediate violence in circumstances likely to produce
that violence. The BrandenburgCourt held:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."

See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
76 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally conducted on a

farm outside Cincinnati. A local Cincinnati television station reporter had been invited to
witness the rally, and he and a cameraman filmed the event, portions of which were later
broadcast on the Cincinnati station and a national network. The film footage was filled with
vile, incendiary racist bile. Klan members pronounced that "the nigger should be returned
to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel," and "if our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have
to be some revengence taken." Id. at 446-47. The state of Ohio prosecuted Brandenburg, the
leader of the Klan group, under an Ohio "criminal syndicalism" law making it illegal to
advocate "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods
of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," or to assemble "with
any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism." Id. at 444- 45 (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed
1974)). Brandenburg was convicted, fined $1,000, and sentenced to one to ten years'
imprisonment. The Supreme Court held the Ohio law unconstitutional. No one was present
at the Klan rally except the Klan members themselves, the television reporter, and his
cameraman. Nothing in the record indicated that the racist messages of the Klansman at the
rally posed any immediate physical threat to anyone.
11 Id. at 447.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:3

In a sequel to Brandenburg,Hess v. Indiana,78 the Court reinforced the standard,
placing particularly emphasis on the requirement of "imminence," thus tightening
the required nexus between violent speech and violent action.79
More than wordplay is required to satisfy the Brandenburg standard; the
government must do more than summarily label expression "threatening" or
"intimidating." 0 A change in terminology is not a change in principle; it is the
substance, not the label, that matters. A particularly telling application of this came
in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo.,"' an extremely interesting case in which the
Court struck down a conviction against civil rights leaders, including Charles Evers,
arising from a civil rights boycott of merchants in Mississippi. The tactics of the
boycott organizers were found by the Mississippi Supreme Court to include threats,
intimidation, and coercion,82 a characterization that was not entirely unfounded. 3
Despite the episodes of sporadic violence in the record and the vitriol of the
defendants' rhetoric, however, the Supreme Court held that the actions of the
boycott organizers were protected by the First Amendment. 4 The Court
acknowledged that Evers' statements could be interpreted as inviting violent
retaliation, "or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence whether or not
improper discipline was specifically intended." 5 But this did not matter, for "[t]o
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
79 Id. at 108-09.
80 See R.AN. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1992).
s1458 U.S. 886 (1982).
82 Id. at 894 (recounting the lower court's finding that "[i]ntimidation, threats, social
ostracism, vilification, and traduction were some of the devices used by the defendants to
achieve the desired results.").
13 To "enforce" the boycott, activists wearing black hats stood outside the
stores writing
down the names of black patrons. After these names were read aloud at meetings and
published in a newspaper, sporadic acts of violence were committed against the persons and
property of those on the list. Charles Evers, one of the boycott leaders, threatened that
boycott breakers would be "disciplihed" and warned that the sheriff could not protect them
at night. Id. at 902. Evers stated at a rally: "Ifwe catch any of you going in any of them
racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." Id.
84 Id. at911-12:
78

In sum, the boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity. The
established elements of speech, assembly, association, and petition, "though not
identical, are inseparable." Through exercise of these First Amendment rights,
petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change.
Through speech, assembly, and petition - rather than through riot or revolution
- petitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them
as second-class citizens.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
85 Id. at 927.
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the extent that Evers caused respondents to suffer business losses through his
organization of the boycott, his emotional and persuasive appeals for unity in the
joint effort, or his 'threats' of vilification or social ostracism, Evers's conduct is
constitutionally protected and beyond the reach of a damages award." 6. The
emotionally charged rhetoric engaged in by Evers, the Court held, could not be
fairly characterized as true incitement:
The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers' speeches did not
transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg. The

lengthy addresses generally contained an impassioned plea for black
citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the
political and economic power available to them. In the course of those
pleas, strong language was used. If that language had been followed by
acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers
could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this
case, however - with the possible exception of the Cox incident - the
acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred weeks or months after the April
1, 1966, speech; the chancellor made no finding of any violence after the
challenged 1969 speech. Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric
cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be

free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for
unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite
lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech. To rule
"debate
otherwise would ignore the "profound national commitment" that
87
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
In sum, it is not exceedingly difficult to distill the core learning of these cases.
A central aim of the modern American First Amendment is to draw a line between
abstract advocacy on the one hand, and the prevention of impending lawless action
on the other.88 Yet while discerning the core meaning ofthese landmark cases is not
difficult, fidelity to them in times of extreme national stress is. It may be that the

Id. at 926.
Id. at 928 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1969)).
8
The Court in Brandenburgarticulated its test in the context of violent crowd behavior
and assembly, and the concern that the law at issue would punish mere abstract advocacy.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969) ("[W]e are here confronted with a statute
which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on
pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of
action."); see also Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Dowel, 477 S.E.2d 741 (Va. 1996) (holding that
under Virginia's "insulting words" statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-45 (Michie 2000), words
must "tend to violence and breach of the peace" to be actionable).
86

87
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First Amendment is most important in the worst of times, 9 but it is the worst of
times that our loyalty to it is most severely taxed.
One recurring temptation is to draw on our past experiences to declare by fiat
that certain forms of expression are inherently incendiary, so that their mere
utterance, standing alone, is sufficient to make the case against the speaker who
utters them. In declaring that the burning of a cross in itself was sufficient to
establish an intent to intimidate, the Virginia General Assembly attempted precisely
this type of shortcut. It is a shortcut that the First Amendment must be understood
to forbid.
One can understand the legislative temptation. One can understand why it
would be quite rational to impute to the Virginia General Assembly a legislative
"finding" that cross burning is an especially common, dangerous, or pernicious
method of intimidation, a form of expression that might reasonably be declared in
advance to presumptively meet the Brandenburg standard. More modestly, we
might easily see the logic in a legislative supposition that cross burning is a
particularly potent and evil tool for intinidation, and on that basis should be singled
as a form of "conduct" so inherently intimidating that it renders permissible a
legislative judgement that the act of cross burning is at minimum prima facie proof
of an intent to intimidate.
This line of reasoning once convinced the United States Supreme Court. In the
early part of the last century the Court routinely affirmed the convictions of anti-war
protestors on the mere "tendency" of speech to make violence or crime more likely
at some indefinite time in the future - a line of reasoning usually described as the
0
"bad tendency" test."
The nadir of free speech protection in the Supreme Court was the corresponding
apex of the bad tendency standard, reached in Gitlow v. New York.9 The Supreme
Court in Gitlow embraced the argument that a legislature could classify certain
utterances as so intrinsically perilous to public security and peace that they could
be declared taboo and their very utterance made criminal.9" Piling on, the Court
See Vincent Blasi, ThePathologicalPerspectiveand theFirstAmendment,85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449,451-52 (1985).
90 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote these three opinions, sending Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk to jail. But
Holmes ultimately repudiated the "bad tendency" approach, in his famous dissent in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), a repudiation that was
ultimately joined and reinforced by Justice Louis Brandeis. See Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205 (1984).
91 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
9' Id. at 669 ("Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace
and to the security of the State.").
89
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then went so far as to pronounce that once the legislature has determined that
certain expression is by nature dangerous, the Constitution does not require proof
that the expression actually posed a danger in an individual prosecution. The
defendant is stripped of the defense that "my speech was no threat to society"
because the legislature has determined in advance that such speech is always a
threat to society.93 This is a neat trick if it's legal; think of what we might do with
it: declare in advance that all public support of Osama bin Laden is inherently
traitorous and seditious, and be done with any proof problems.
Oliver Wendell Holmes (joined by Justice Brandeis), had migrated in his free
speech thinking from his earlier opinions by the time of Gitlow, and was now a
strong advocate of a robust First Amendment. Holmes dissented sharply in Gitlow,
taking particular aim at the Court's willingness to defer to the legislature's
discretion regarding the inherent danger of the proscribed speech, in one of his most
eloquent defenses of freedom of speech.9 4 The end point of this story is that the
view of Holmes and Brandeis, originally expressed in ringing dissent,95 would
9 Id. at 670:

In other words, when the legislative body has determined generally, in the
constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve
such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether
any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of
itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration.
Id.
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting):
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the
result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the
redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present
conflagration.
Id.
95 As Justice Brandeis explained in Whitney v. California,274 U.S. 357 (1927):

This legislative declaration ...does not preclude enquiry into the question
whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the conditions existed which
are essential to validity under the Federal Constitution.... Whenever the
fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been
invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there
actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was
imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify
the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature.
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ultimately prevail and become established doctrine.96 Mere "bad tendency" is no
longer enough to justify the abridgment of expression, nor may a legislature "precertify" in advance that certain words or symbols are inherently dangerous or
harmful.97
Id. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring). The government may use general laws such as
trespass to accomplish its purposes of crime-deterrence, but it may not by brute fiat render
certain phrases, symbols, or associations illegal:
Thus, a State might, in the exercise of its police power, make any trespass upon
the land of another a crime, regardless of the results or of the intent or purpose
of the trespasser. It might, also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an
incitement to commit the trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this Court
would hold constitutional a statute which punished as a felony the mere
voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that pedestrians had the moral
right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to advocate their doing so,
even if there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead to a trespass. The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property
is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious
injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
Id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
" See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
97 In LandmarkCommunications,Inc. v. Virginia,435 U.S. 829 (1978), for example, the
Supreme Court struck down a conviction against a newspaper for violating confidentiality
provisions applicable to Virginia's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission,
notwithstanding the legislature's express declaration that breaches of confidentiality
constituted a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. Id. at 838. The
legislature, the Court held, could not make such an advance finding, and in so doing purport
to preclude independent judicial review of the question of whether, in the particular factual
circumstances, such a clear and present danger existed, on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 843
("This legislative declaration coupled with the stipulated fact that Landmark published the
disputed article was regarded by the court as sufficient to justify imposition of criminal
sanctions. Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First
Amendment rights are at stake."); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971):
Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one
can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon
the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the
expression of unpopular views.
Id.; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937):
The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the
exception rather than the rule and the penalizing even of utterances of a defined
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If the legislative fiat device is plainly unconstitutional, however, there remains
one last issue regarding the impact of the events of September 11 that presents a
more subtle and difficult puzzle. While it may be true that the government could
not "pre-certify" pro-Osama bin Laden speech as inherently destructive of public

security and order, is it permissible for judges and juries to take into account the
new social context created by the September 11 attacks in applying the existing First
Amendment standard to individual cases?
It may be true that Brandenburgrequires us to separate "abstract advocacy"
from speech that in some palpable and immediate sense is threatening or inciting.

But incendiary rhetoric that seemed abstract prior to September 11 does not seem
so abstract anymore.
What we once may have been willing to dismiss as hyperbolic bluster we may
now treat seriously as threat." Separating graphic language and emotional
exaggeration from genuine threats is an old First Amendment problem. In Watts v.
United States," the defendant Watts was convicted of willfully making a threat to
take the life of the president during a public rally at the Washington Monument. In
the course of expressing his opposition to the draft, Watts stated: "I have already
received my draft classification as I-A and I have got to report for my physical this
Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man
I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.' ° The Supreme Court overturned Watts's
conviction, reasoning that when taken in context what Watts said was protected by
the First Amendment, for it was no more than "a kind of very crude offensive
method of stating a political opposition to the President."''
Yet if context was enough in Watts to get the defendant off the hook, might it
be enough today to put another defendant on it? Imagine that Amhad, our fictitious
supporter of Osama bin Laden, were to say, "if the United States harms Osama bin
character must frnd its justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to
organized government. The judgment of the legislature is not unfettered.
Id.
9 See, e.g., Chisun Lee, New York's Anti-Terror Express, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 19,
2002, at 35 ("'One of the things some us did on the first sunny day to get off school would
now be a class-D felony,' said attorney Russ Neufeld... referring to a new state statute on
false bomb threats . . . ."); Oflicer Demoted for 'Taliban' Prank, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 13, 2001, at 5B ("A Miami-Dade police officer was demoted from
lieutenant to patrolman for writing 'The Taliban' on a letter meant for his captain...
. The
letter did not contain any powder, but the county treated it as a possible anthrax threat and
summoned the fire department.").
9 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
'0 Id. at 706.
101 Id. at 708.
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Laden, I am going to get my rifle and put George W. Bush in my sights." Could
Amhad be arrested for threatening the president? Would the Supreme Court affirm
his conviction, reaching a different result from that in Watts?
There is not space here to fully and properly explore this question, but some
preliminary observations are in order. First, in much the same manner that the
Virginia cross-burning case seemed to bridge the events of September 11 and
provide a kind of judicial bellwether on our evolving national debate, a case
working its way through the federal courts on the West Coast provides a similarly
illuminating window.
The litigation, which has been nicknamed The "Nuremberg Files" case, is
PlannedParenthoodof Columbia/Williamette,Inc. v. American Coalition of Life

Activists. 0 2 The case is actually a civil action, brought by a consortium ofplaintiffs
who were principally providers of abortion services or entities providing counseling
regarding abortion services. The plaintiffs filed suit in an Oregon federal court
against various members of a particularly violent and extreme faction of the antiabortion movement. It was alleged that the defendants, through posters, pamphlets,
and Internet postings, had accused various abortion providers of "crimes against
humanity," and offered rewards to persons who could provide information leading
to the revocation ofthe abortion providers' medical licenses or to anyone who could
persuade them to cease performing abortions.'° 3 It was claimed, however, that the
defendants went beyond these tactics, making some of their attacks more pointed
and individualized. For example, in one poster, a specific abortion provider, Doctor
Robert Christ, was featured by name, along with his photograph, and his work and
home addresses.'O° The defendants had a process for assembling dossiers on various
abortion providers, judges, and political leaders deemed supportive of abortion
rights. These dossiers became known as the "Nuremberg Files," and a web page
maintained by some of the defendants included the names and addresses of doctors
who performed abortions, and invited others to contribute additional names. 5 In
a macabre touch, the website denoted the names of those already victimized by
anti-abortion violence, striking through the names of those who had been murdered
and graying out the names of the wounded.'0 6
The case is made difficult by the fact that neither the posters nor the website
contained any explicit threats against the doctors.0 7 Yet one can easily empathize
with the fear and foreboding that the expression ofthe defendants must have placed
244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.), reh 'g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001). The
panel opinion in the Ninth Circuit was written by Judge Alex Kozinski.
102

03

Id. at 1017.

Id. at 1012.
'0'
Id. at 1012-13.
'04

,0"Id. at 1013.
'o'Id. at 10 18.

2002]

TERRORISM AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

in the hearts and minds of those doctors. After all, they knew that in the past similar
posters prepared by others had preceded clinic bombings and murders.0 8 Thus the
doctors argued that, by publishing the names and addresses, the defendants had
stripped the doctors of their privacy and anonymity and given violent anti-abortion
activists the concrete information required to locate the doctors and attempt to kill
them. 0' 9 There was evidence that the doctors took the "Nuremberg Files" as serious
threats: they began wearing bulletproof vests; drawing the curtains on the windows
of their homes; and accepting the protection ofUnited States Marshals." 0 What the
defendants had done went beyond abstract expression, they claimed, and constituted
real threats against their lives. A jury agreed, and awarded the doctors $107 million
in damages.I I
The Ninth Circuit reversed, observing that:
Extreme rhetoric and violent action have marked many political movements
in American history. Patriots intimidated loyalists in both word and deed
as they gathered support for American independence. John Brown and
other abolitionists, convinced that God was on their side, committed murder
in pursuit of their cause. In more modem times, the labor, antiwar, animal
rights and environmental movements all have had their violent fringes. As
a result, much of what was said even by nonviolent participants in these
movements acquired a tinge of menace."12
Nevertheless, the court insisted, our First Amendment thinking has evolved, and we
no longer permit the government to penalize menacing speech merely because in
some quite broad sense it makes society collectively less safe. 3 This kind of "bad
tendency" reasoning has given way to the more demanding requirements of cases
such as Brandenburg, requiring concreteness and immediacy." 4 The court
'oa PlannedParenthood,244 F.3d at 1013.
109 Id.
110 Id.

Id.

"'

Id. at 1014.
" Id. at 1014-15.
"14 PlannedParenthood,244 F.3d at
1015:
2

Political speech may not be punished just because it makes it more likely that
someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future by an unrelated
third party .... It doesn't matter if the speech makes future violence more likely;
advocating "illegal action at some indefinite future time" is protected. If the
First Amendment protects speech advocating violence, then it must also protect
speech that does not advocate violence but still makes it more likely. Unless
ACLA threatened that its members would themselves assault the doctors, the
First Amendment protects its speech.
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admitted, as it had to, that the speech ofthe abortion activists frightened the doctors,
and in a subjective sense was threatening and fearful.' But this was not enough,
the court insisted. The pivotal First Amendment question turned on the source of
their fear." 6 It was possible that the doctors understood the statements as veiled
threats that the members of the activist organization would inflict bodily harm on
the doctors unless they stopped performing abortions."' Ifthis were the appropriate
interpretation, the defendants' statements would not be sheltered by First
Amendment." 8 (And this would be true even if it turned out that the defendants
lacked the means to carry out the threats.) The problem was that it could also have
been the case that the defendants' statements were not themselves veiled threats, but
instead in some more vague sense "put the doctors in harm's way," ' because
against the backdrop of past violence against abortion providers, and the broad
social context of our experience with violence regarding the abortion issue, these
statements were rendered more frightening. If this more generalized sense of
"threat" or"intimidation" was what supported thejury's verdict, the court reasoned,
it could not stand. 0
A main conundrum in the case was that the literal statements of the defendants
did not overtly or explicitly threaten. To make a threat out of it, one had to examine
the larger social context, especially the history of the more violent factions of the
anti-abortion movement. The court in PlannedParenthoodthus put the question:
"Can context supply the violent message that language alone leaves out? While no
case answers this question, we note important theoretical objections to stretching
context so far.""'2
Context, the court first noted, is often not the speaker's own creation; the
speaker neither makes it nor controls it. There were great perils, in the court's view,
in moving the notion of "threat" from a pointed face-to-face or one-on-one
communication, the classic kind of "threat" known to criminal and tort law, to a
more general "over the transom" threat communicated to the general public through
22
modes of mass communication.
[W]hat may be hyperbole in a public speech may be understood (and
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam)); see
also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
"' Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1015.
116

Id.

117 Id.
118 Id.

...
Id. at 1017.
120 Id. at 10 19-20 (ruling the FirstAmendment "does notpermit the imposition of liability
on that basis").
"
Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1018.
122 Id. at

1019.
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intended) as a threat if communicated directly to the person threatened,
whether face-to-face, by telephone or by letter. In targeting the recipient
personally, the speaker leaves no doubt that he is sending the recipient a
message of some sort. In contrast, typical political statements at rallies or
through the media are far more diffuse in their focus because they are
generally intended, at least in part, to shore up political support for the
speaker's position.'23
When dealing with speech on political issues such as abortion uttered through the
mainstream channels of modem public media, the court argued, we must grant to
the speakers the maximum levels of protection afforded by the First Amendment. 24
I find that many ofthe observations ofthe panel opinion in PlannedParenthood
are enormously helpful. While I would not rule out - and do not read the panel
opinion in PlannedParenthoodas ruling out - the possibility that a "true threat"
could exist when uttered through the mass media, it does seem that the proper
application of our First Amendment traditions requires that we take this step only
rarely, and only when the proof of intent and effect is solid, and not the stuff of
mere circumstantial inference and innuendo.'

If these thoughts explain how I believe the conflicts posed here should be
resolved, they do not by any means correspond to how we might predict they will
in fact be resolved. The cross-burning case was decided by the Virginia Supreme
Court on November 2, 2001. By a vote of 4-3, the Court struck down the Virginia
cross-burning law, in an opinion written by Justice Donald Lemons.'26 The Virginia
Supreme Court's opinion rested on the viewpoint discrimination inherent in the law,
and did not reach (as it did not need to reach) the Brandenburgquestion.' 27 As of

123

Id.

124 Id.
125 This is not meant as a disparaging comment on the factual merits of the Planned
Parenthoodcase; like many who have looked at the litigation I find the case excruciatingly
close, and certainly sympathize with the plaintiffs' sense of threat. Despite that, however,
I believe the panel opinion cogently addressed the perils of making a case out of broad
"context."
"2 Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), rev'g O'Mara v.
Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175 (Va. Ct. App. 2000),petitionforcert.filed, 70 U.S.L.W.
3497 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2002) (No. 01-1107). The majority opinion of Justice Lemons was
joined by Justices Lacy, Kinser, and Whiting. Justice Kinser joined fully in the majority
opinion, and also wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Whiting. Id. at 747 (Kinser,
J., concurring).
127 Id. at 746.
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this writing, the commonwealth has publicly announced its intention to seek review
in the United States Supreme Court,'28 and in light of that declaration, the case
remains "alive," and as an advocate in it I feel ethically constrained to avoid
additional comment on the outcome in the Virginia Supreme Court, other than to
say generally that, with the other defense lawyers in the case, I was gratified that the
Court accepted our interpretation of the First Amendment principles emanating
from R.A. V., and accepted our view that the cross-burning statute was fatally
infected with viewpoint discrimination. 29 I found the Court's conclusion especially
persuasive:
Under our system of government, people have the right to use symbols to
communicate. They may patriotically wave the flag or burn it in protest;
they may reverently worship the cross or bum it as an expression of
bigotry. Neutrally expressed statutes prohibiting vandalism, assault, and
trespass may have vitality for the prosecution of particularly offensive
conduct. While reasonable prohibitions upon time, place, and manner of
speech, and statutes of neutral application may be enforced, government
may not regulate speech based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the
underlying message expressed. 3
In an eloquent dissent, Justice Hassell disagreed, arguing that the First
Amendment was never intended to shelter the type of racist and intimidating speech
engaged in by the defendants.'' Although I disagreed with Justice Hassell's
jurisprudence, I admired the passion and courage of his dissent, and readily
acknowledge that it was powerfully resonant with many of our fellow Americans,
particularly after the events of September 11.
As for the PlannedParenthoodcase, the panel decision of Judge Kozinksi has
been vacated and reheard en banc by the entire United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.' 32 As of this writing, a decision is still pending.
It would thus be fair to say that in both of these cases, the ultimate outcome
remains in doubt. The Osama bin Laden effigy conflict that is described here is
imaginary, but not contrived. As a society we will surely be facing the questions
it poses in the coming months and years. This essay has been offered up in the hope
that it may contribute to the dialogue on how those questions ought to be resolved.
28

cert.).

Viginiav. Black, 70 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Jan. 24,2002) (No. 01-1107) (petition for

These views, pressed in our briefs and oral arguments, are in the public domain.
'30 Black, 553 S.E.2d at 746.
'' Id. at 748 (Hasselll, J., dissenting). Justice Hasselll's dissent was joined by Justice
Koontz and Chief Justice Carrico.
132 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (argued
and submitted Dec. 11, 2001).
129
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I was honored to be invited to contribute this essay on the proud occasion of the
tenth anniversary of the Bill of Rights Journal. I hope I am invited to contribute
again on its twentieth.

